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The nature of social dilemmas is studied in n-strategy evolutionary potential games on a square lattice with
nearest-neighbor interactions and the logit rule. For symmetric games with symmetric payoff matrices there
are no dilemmas because of the coincidence of individual and common interests. The dilemmas are caused by
the antisymmetric parts of the self- and cross-dependent payoff components if it modifies the preferred Nash
equilibrium. The contentment of players and the emergence of dilemmas in the preferred Nash equilibria are
illustrated on some two-dimensional cross sections of the parameter space.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Social dilemmas were first recognized by Flood and Dresher
in 1950 [1,2] when studying two-player two-strategy games
within the framework of traditional game theory [3]. The
observed situation became a world-wide phenomenon via the
story of the prisoner’s dilemma suggested by Tucker. The
original story of the prisoner’s dilemma hid the importance of
this phenomenon occurring in many other real-life situations
when the selfish participants cannot receive optimum payoffs.
The relevance of this phenomenon in the level of interactions
raised plenty of questions about the applicability of game the-
ory in different fields of science, including political decisions,
economy, biology, and social sciences. At the same time the
systematic investigation of these dilemmas was delayed by the
“folk theorem” predicting the elimination of the dilemma for
the repeated games [4]. The progressive activity in the study
of social dilemmas was initiated by the computer tournaments
conducted by Axelrod [5] and also by the development of
evolutionary game theory providing a general mathematical
framework to analyze quantitatively the living systems [6–14].
In the last decades numerous attempts have been devel-
oped to find ways to avoid the undesired consequences of
social dilemmas. These approaches include the application of
different protocols [15,16], the repetition of games together
with the introduction of evolutionary processes [5,6,17,18],
and the reduction of the number of interacting players to a
small quenched [19,20] or evolving neighborhood [21,22]. It
is now well known that the maintenance of cooperation can
be increased if the evolution is controlled by the imitation
of a better neighbor. The efficiency of the latter mechanism
depends on the noise level and some topological features of
the connectivity structure [20,23–25]. In the level of cooper-
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ation the most relevant improvement is achieved for irregular
networks [20]. Similar positive mechanisms can be generated
when the models are extended with personal features (e.g.,
reputation [26–29], age [30], or fraternity [31,32]). Many other
additional features can also be considered by extending the
number of strategies (possible third strategies can illustrate
the voluntarism [33] or punishment [34–37]) that reflect the
presence of dilemmas for the multistrategy systems, too.
The identification and distinction of social dilemmas re-
quire the determination and comparison of Nash equilibria
[38] when studying their Pareto inefficiency in the space
of strategy profiles [39]. In the literature of game theory
a wide range of methods are described which can be used
for the classification of games. For example, a taxonomy of
two-player two-strategy games (henceforth 2 × 2 games) has
been suggested by Rapoport and Guyer [40] who simplified
the problem by considering only the rank of payoffs. In
evolutionary game theory the determination of evolutionarily
stable strategy (ESS) [6] can be used to distinguish the games
or interactions. If replicator dynamics controls the evolution
then phase portraits (characterizing fixed points) classify the
games [41,42]. Further aspects of the general features of social
dilemmas are also discussed in some recent papers [43–45]
with further references therein.
The classification of interactions becomes transparent for
the symmetric 2 × 2 games when the possible payoffs are
defined by four values of the payoff matrix. The payoff
components, however, can be modified by a constant and
we can choose a suitable unit, as detailed later. In the cor-
responding two-dimensional parameter space, four types of
games are distinguished [8,9,11,46], for which the different
features of social dilemmas are well discussed. All these
symmetric 2 × 2 games are potential games which allow us
to determine the preferred Nash equilibrium identified by the
maximum value of the potential [47–51]. The preferred Nash
equilibrium resembles the ground state of a physical system.
Additionally, the multi-agent systems with equivalent players
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and interactions evolve into a Boltzmann distribution when
the so-called logit rule controls the random sequential strategy
updates in the system. Now we extend the analysis for the
symmetric n × n potential games. It will be shown that all the
relevant features and types of dilemmas are inherited if n is
increased.
The present analysis is based on the concept of matrix de-
composition surveyed briefly in the next section (for a detailed
analysis of this approach we suggest reading our previous
papers [51–53]). First, the application of this method will
be illustrated for the symmetric 2 × 2 games. Subsequently,
the different effects of the antisymmetric matrix components
will be demonstrated and discussed by considering typical
examples. Most of the deduced statements can be derived from
the analysis of the pair potential matrix. The variation of the
preferred Nash equilibrium causes striking consequences in the
spatial distribution of strategies for evolutionary games when
the players are located on the sites of a square lattice and the
noise level of the logit rule is tuned.
II. FORMALISM AND GENERAL FEATURES
In the evolutionary games discussed here equivalent players
are located on the sites (x) of a square lattice. Each player can
choose one of her n pure strategies sx denoted by the traditional
n-dimensional Cartesian unit vectors or by an integer i if the
player uses her ith strategy. Using their strategies the players
play the same game with all their nearest neighbors (located at
sites y = x + δ). The accumulated payoff u˜x(sx) is given by
the expression [3]
u˜x(sx) =
∑
δ
sx · Asx+δ, (1)
where the Aij component of the n × n payoff matrix defines
the player’s income if she chooses her ith strategy while the
co-player selects the j th one. The given pair interaction is
a potential game if we can introduce a symmetric potential
matrix V (Vij = Vji) that satisfies the following conditions:
sx · Asy − s′x · Asy = sx · Vsy − s′x · Vsy, (2)
for all possible pure strategies sx , s′x , and sy . This quantity
summarizes the incentive of active players and its meaning is
similar to the negative potential energy for an interacting pair
of players. For multi-agent lattice systems the total potential
U (s) depends on the strategy profile s = {sx} and summarizes
the contributions of all nearest-neighbor pairs; that is,
U (s) = 1
2
∑
x,δ
sx · Vsx+δ. (3)
A similar expression can be used to describe the potential
energy of a multistate lattice system in physics.
As mentioned in the Introduction, a remarkable feature
of the multi-agent evolutionary potential games is that, for
the application of the logit rule, these systems evolve into a
Boltzmann distribution [47,51,54] where in the stationary state
the strategy profile s occurs with a probability
p(s) = e
U (s)/K∑
s′ e
U (s′)/K . (4)
For the logit rule [55–58], unilateral strategy changes are
repeated by randomly selected players who can choose a new
strategy s′x with a probability
w(s′x) =
eu˜x (s
′
x )/K∑
sx
eu˜x (sx )/K
(5)
that depends on the neighboring strategies and favors expo-
nentially the higher individual income. In evolutionary games
K quantifies the noise or errors in the decision processes
and its role is similar to temperature in physical systems
where the logit rule is a generalized version of the Glauber
dynamics [59] introduced for the investigation of the kinetic
Ising model. Consequently, in the mathematical analysis of
evolutionary potential games one can exploit the concepts,
tools, and approaches of equilibrium statistical physics when
the number of participants is large. Thus, on the square lattice
the ordered strategy arrangement in the low-noise limit (K →
0) is determined by the maximum value of the potential matrix
V. For example, if max(Vij ) = V11 then all players follow
the first strategy. Conversely, both of the chessboard-like
arrangements of the first and second strategies are stable when
max(Vij ) = V12 = V21 in the limit K → 0. These ordered
states tend to the random strategy distribution if K → ∞.
The existence of potential V prohibits the presence of rock-
paper-scissors–type cyclic components in the payoff matrix
[51]. Recently it has turned out [51–53,60] that the payoff
matrix A of a potential game can be built up as a sum of different
types of interactions; namely,
A = A(av) + A(se) + A(cr) + A(co), (6)
where
A
(av)
ij = a(av) =
1
n2
∑
i,j
Aij (7)
represents the contribution of average payoff a(av), and the
terms
A
(se)
ij = εi =
1
n
∑
j
Aij − a(av), (8)
A
(cr)
ij = γj =
1
n
∑
i
Aij − a(av), (9)
define the payoffs for the self- and cross-dependent elementary
games. In contrary to the previous notations [51], now both
A(se) and A(cr) are defined by (n − 1) independent parame-
ters because the coefficients satisfy the conditions
∑
i γi =∑
i εi = 0.
The coordination component summarizes the contributions
of coordination between all possible strategy pairs (i,j ) (i < j )
with a strength of νij in a way that A(co)ij = A(co)ji = −νij and the
diagonal components ensure that the sums of payoffs become
zero in each row and column [60]; that is,∑
i
A
(co)
ij =
∑
j
A
(co)
ij = 0. (10)
Due to the above features the components in Eq. (6) are
mutually orthogonal to each other in the sense that A(av) ·
A(se) = A(av) · A(cr) = · · · = A(cr) · A(co) = 0, where the scalar
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product of the matrices A and A′ is defined as
A · A′ =
∑
i,j
AijA
′
ij . (11)
An arbitrary n × n payoff matrix is described by n2 real val-
ues. The potential matrix V is symmetric and is defined by [n +
n(n − 1)/2] independent parameters involving an irrelevant or
arbitrary constant term proportional to A(av). The rest of the
parameters are determined by the values of εi and νij because
A(cr) gives zero contribution to V. The existence of potential is
prevented by the presence of cyclic components that are given
by (n − 1)(n − 2)/2 coefficients measuring the strengths of the
independent rock-paper-scissors–type subgames [51,53].
In the friendship or fraternal [31,32,41,61,62] game the
payoff matrix is symmetric (A(fr)ij = A(fr)ji or A(fr) = A(fr)T).
These interactions describe situations when the equivalent
players share the income equally for all the possible strategy
profiles. For these games the coincidence of the individual
and common interest eliminates the source of social dilem-
mas. Furthermore, these games are potential games and the
corresponding potential matrix is equal to the payoff matrix.
The symmetric part of the payoff matrix can be separated
as
A(fr) = 12 (A + AT) = A(av) + A(co) + A(ex), (12)
where
A(ex) = 12 (A(se) + A(cr) + A(se)T + A(cr)T). (13)
For later convenience the above symmetric portion of the self-
and cross-dependent components is written as a sum of n
elementary games as
A(ex) =
∑
i
βiF(i), (14)
where βi = (εi + γi)/2 with
∑
i βi = 0,
F(1) =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
2 1 1 · · · 1
1 0 0 · · · 0
1 0 0 · · · 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1 0 0 · · · 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠, (15)
and the other F(k) matrices can be constructed from F(1)
by exchanging its first and kth rows and columns. These
matrices can also be expressed by Kronecker δ symbols as
Fij (k) = δik + δjk . The potential of A(ex) is equal to itself and
this term acts like a multidimensional external field in the
n-state Potts model. More precisely, A(ex) favors the dominance
of the j th strategy if max(βi) = βj and the corresponding
payoff is positive in the preferred Nash equilibrium.
The antisymmetric part of the payoff matrix is defined as
A(as) = 12 (A − AT) = 12 (A(se) + A(cr) − A(se)T − A(cr)T),
(16)
and arises from the self- and cross-dependent components. This
term is responsible for the appearance of social dilemmas in the
potential games and can be described as a linear combination
of the adjacency matrices of directed star graphs [53]. More
quantitatively,
A(as) =
∑
i
αiH(i), (17)
with αi = (εi − γi)/2 (
∑
i αi = 0) and the first matrix is given
as
H(1) =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 1 1 · · · 1
−1 0 0 · · · 0
−1 0 0 · · · 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
−1 0 0 · · · 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠. (18)
The matrices H(i) (i > 1) can be obtained from H(1) by
exchanging its first and ith rows and columns.
H(1) defines a two-player zero-sum game that does not
modify the players’ total income. In this curious game the
players have two options: to be a winner (strategy 1) or looser
(strategy i > 1). A unit payoff transfer from the looser to the
winner occurs for the suitable choices, otherwise they receive
nothing. The rationality or selfishness compels both players
to choose the first strategy without any rewards. The potential
matrix of H(1) is equivalent to F(1) defined by Eq. (15).
Games with a payoff matrix H(i) exhibit similar features
and favor the choice of the ith strategy. For the linear com-
binations of these interactions, as defined by Eq. (17), the
corresponding potential matrix can be given as
V(as) =
∑
i
αiF(i). (19)
Notice that in the whole parameter space the possible potential
matrices of A(ex) and A(as) span the same subset. If A = A(as)
then rationality favors the choice of the j th strategy for both
players (as well as for all the players on the square lattice) if
max(αi) = αj .
The presence of the antisymmetric payoff matrix compo-
nent (A(as) = 0) can help the players and also the whole society
to get optimum payoffs if the preferred Nash equilibria of A(as)
and A(fr) coincide, as will be illustrated later. In these cases
A(as) acts as the “invisible hand” offered by Adam Smith (for a
short discussion of the invisible hand see the books [11,13] and
papers [39,63]). In most of the cases, however, the preferred
Nash equilibria of A(as) and A(fr) are different. Social dilemmas
occur when A(as) is sufficiently strong to change the preferred
Nash equilibrium dictated by A(fr). In the latter potential games
A(as) acts as Ate’s hand and can be depicted as the root of all
evil. In Greek mythology Ate (the eldest daughter of Zeus) is
the goddess of delusion, infatuation, and mischief. To preserve
the harmony in heaven Zeus threw her down to Earth.
In the next sections we discuss the effects of A(as) for n = 2
and 3 by considering typical examples.
III. TWO-STRATEGY GAMES
First, we remind the reader that all symmetric two-strategy
games are potential games. Furthermore, for n = 2, the above
criteria simplify the decomposition of the 2 × 2 payoff matrix
into the sum of four orthogonal elementary components that
reflect the general features mentioned above.
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For the traditional notation of the symmetric two-strategy
social dilemmas the strategies are denoted by C (cooperation)
and D (defection) and the four values of a single payoff matrix
are denoted as R (reward), S (sucker’s payoff), T (temptation),
and P (punishment) [1]. For the given matrix
A =
(
R S
T P
)
, (20)
it is assumed that R > P . Most of the analyses are constrained
to the cases when R = 1, P = 0, and T + S < 2. The last
condition excludes the parameter region where the players
would receive the highest income when choosing alternately
the (C,D) and D,C strategy pairs in repeated games.
Usually, four types of games are distinguished for rescaled
payoffs on the T -S parameter plane [8,9,11,46]. In the range
of harmony game (T < 1 and S > 0) the system has one Nash
equilibrium (C,C) when both players receive R = 1. For the
prisoner’s dilemma the game also has a single Nash equilibrium
(D,D) that provides zero income for both, which is smaller
then what they would receive for the opposite choices (and
hence the dilemma). The stag-hunt game (T < 1 and S < 0)
has two Nash equilibria: (C,C) and (D,D). The maximum
value of the potential matrix
V =
(
R T
T T − S + P
)
(21)
favors the choice of (C,C) if R > T − S + P (or S > T − 1).
For the opposite case (S < T − 1) the dilemma occurs, too.
In the region of the hawk-dove game (T > 1 and S > 0)
the system has three Nash equilibria: (C,D), (D,C), and a
symmetric mixed strategy profile that is an evolutionarily stable
strategy [6]. The latter one dominates the system behavior
in well-mixed populations and also on lattices if imitation
of a better neighboring strategy controls the dynamics. For
the application of the logit rule, however, the neighboring
players favor the choice of one of the two equivalent preferred
pure strategies that results in a sublattice ordered strategy
arrangement on the square lattice in the zero-noise limit [64].
Figure 1 illustrates the possible preferred Nash equilibria
and the contentment of players on the T -S parameter plane.
In this map the preferred Nash equilibria are denoted by
a pair of white (C) and/or black (D) symbols. The pairs
of symbols are located horizontally if the players receive
equivalent payoffs. Smiling faces indicate satisfied players
getting optimum payoffs. On the contrary, the frowning faces
of D players refer to their disappointment where the selfish
players fall into the trap of the tragedy of the commons. Notice
that the C players can also be unsatisfied for T + S > 2 and
T < 1 when the choices (D,C) or (C,D) would result in higher
total income for them. For the latter parameters, however, one
of the players should make a sacrifice for increasing the total
payoff. In other words, here the profit of the C player exceeds
the loss of his or her co-player changing from C to D.
For the vertical arrangements of symbols, the upper player
gets higher income and smiles. All these pairs refer to twofold
degenerate preferred Nash equilibria. In these cases the lower
player is smiling (frowning) if the given choice provides higher
(lower) total income for them.
The above analyses become more convenient and adaptable
for a larger number of strategies if the payoff matrix is built up
S
T
2
1
-1
20
FIG. 1. Contentment of players for the preferred Nash equilibria
as a function ofT andS forR = 1 andP = 0. The axesT andS divide
the plane into four segments characterizing the harmony, hawk-dove,
stag-hunt, and prisoner’s dilemma games. Thick dash-dotted lines
separate regions possessing similar behavior. The explanation of the
symbols is given in the text.
from the four orthogonal elementary games. In this frame the
present matrix can be written as
A = a(av)
(
1 1
1 1
)
+ ν12
(
1 −1
−1 1
)
+β1
(
1 0
0 −1
)
+ α1
(
0 1
−1 0
)
, (22)
with
a(av) = R + S + T + P
4
, ν12 = R − S − T + P4 ,
β1 = R − P2 , α1 =
S − T
2
. (23)
Here the first coefficient denotes the average payoff, and the
second one defines the strength of the coordination between
the two strategies. Additionally, we have exploited that βis can
be expressed by one independent parameter (β2 = −β1) and
F(1) − F(2) is given by the third matrix in Eq. (22). Similarly,
for the fourth term α1 = −α2 and H(2) = −H(1). It is worth
mentioning that the above matrices are orthogonal to each
other and this fact can be exploited when determining the
corresponding coefficients.
In this frame, if ν12 = 0, A is defined by two parameters
(α1, β1) and it is equivalent to the donation game [11,65],
representing the simplest version of the social dilemma. In that
case the maximum value of the potential matrix prefers one of
the homogeneous pure strategies; namely, (1,1) if α1 + β1 > 0
or (2,2) for α1 + β1 < 0, meanwhile the payoffs are β1 or
−β1, respectively. Thus, the tragedy of the commons emerges
if α1 + β1 < 0 and β1 > 0 or α1 + β1 > 0 and β1 < 0 (see
Fig. 2). This situation remains unchanged in the presence of
coordination (ν12 > 0) because it increases equally the relevant
elements of A and V.
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β1
α1
1
0
-1
-1 1
FIG. 2. Contentment map on the α1-β1 plane for ν12  0.
On the contrary, the presence of an anticoordination com-
ponent (ν12 < 0) causes relevant changes on the map of
contentment as is summarized in Fig. 3. Comparison of Figs. 2
and 3 illustrates well that, for large values of |α1| and |β1|,
the contribution of coordination becomes negligible except in
the close vicinity of the line α1 + β1 = 0 where the opposite
effects of A(ex) and A(as) are balanced. Along this line (α1 +
β1 = 0) the (1,2) or (2,1) strategy pairs are preferred equally
which yields a sublattice ordered strategy arrangement on a
square lattice.
Before detailing the noise dependence we remind the reader
that, in the terminology of Ising model [66,67], the strategies
are replaced by spin-up and -down states, A summarizes the
interactions between the neighboring spins, which includes
an irrelevant constant in the form of the ferro- (ν12 > 0) or
antiferromagnetic (ν12 < 0) interactions, and the effect of a
β1
α1
4
0
-4
-4 4
FIG. 3. Contentment map on the α1-β1 plane for ν12 = −1.
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FIG. 4. Average payoff vs noise if ν12 = 1 for several values of α1
andβ1:α1 = β1 = 0 (thick solid line);α1 = 0,β1 = 0.1 (dashed line);
α1 = 0.1, β1 = 0 (dotted line); α1 = −0.15, β1 = 0.1 (dashed-dotted
line); andα1 = −0.05,β1 = 0.1 (thin line). The arrow shows the value
of Kc for α1 = −β1.
homogeneous magnetic field. The fourth (antisymmetric or
non-Hermitian) term is missing in physical systems.
Monte Carlo simulations are performed on a square lattice
to quantify the noise dependence of the average strategy
frequencies and payoffs for several values of parameters. In
these numerical analyses the statistical error is comparable to
the line thickness because of the sufficiently large system size
a sampling time. First we discuss the effects of α1 and β1 for
fixed coordination (ν12 = 1). This system undergoes an Ising-
type critical phase transition at K = Kc = 2/ ln (
√
2 + 1)
[68,69] from one of the ordered strategy arrangements to a
disordered one if K is increased for α + β = 0. The two
ordered phases are equivalent if α1 = β1 = 0. On the contrary,
if α1 = −β1 = 0 then the opposite effects of A(ex) and A(as) are
balanced, therefore the strategy frequencies exhibit similar K
dependence; meanwhile the average payoffs are different in the
two ordered phases. This phenomenon will be demonstrated
later for n = 3.
In Fig. 4 the thick solid line illustrates the continuous de-
crease of the average payoff if K is increased in the absence of
the self- and cross-dependent components. In this coordination
game at low noise the high average payoff is ensured by the
dominance of (1,1) or (2,2) strategy pairs. Among the plotted
examples the highest average incomes are received by the
players for α1 = 0 and β1 = 0.1 when most of the players
choose strategy 1 at low noise and the critical phase transition
in the strategy frequencies is smoothed out. Simultaneously, the
average income is increased by the term A(ex). The situation
resembles the application of a homogeneous magnetic field in
the Ising model.
Exactly the same variation in the strategy frequencies can
be observed for α1 = 0.1 and β1 = 0. In that case, however,
the antisymmetric component does not modify the average
payoff arising exclusively from the coordination in the ordered
phase. At the same time, the numerical results (dotted line
in Fig. 4) indicate the increase of the average payoff in the
presence of noise (K > 0). The resultant extra payoff comes
from the preference of (1,1) strategy pairs at the expense
of other constellations. Evidently, the K dependence of the
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FIG. 5. Average payoff as a function of K for ν12 = −1 if α1 =
β1 = 0 (thick solid line); α1 = 0, β1 = 0.4 (dashed line); and α1 =
0.4, β1 = 0 (dotted line). The arrow shows the critical point for α1 +
β1 = 0.
average payoff will be similar for α1 = −0.1 and β1 = 0 when
the strategy pairs (2,2) are preferred by the actual potential.
Two additional curves in Fig. 4 illustrate what happens
when the symmetric and antisymmetric terms support different
homogeneous strategy pairs. The thin solid line represents a
situation when the symmetric term dominates the behavior and
increases the average payoff in the preferred ordered state. In
the opposite case (see the thin dashed-dotted line) the stronger
antisymmetric component will determine the homogeneous
preferred strategy pair while the corresponding average payoff
is decreased by the symmetric one.
Basically different effects are caused by α1 and β1 for
ν12 = −1 when the anticoordination favors one of the two
equivalent checkerboard-like strategy distributions in the low-
noise limit. Due to the equivalence between the ferro- and
antiferromagnetic Ising models these sublattice ordered states
are transformed into a disordered phase at the same critical
noise [Kc = 2/ ln (
√
2 + 1)] when K is increased. It is em-
phasized that the K dependence of strategy frequencies (in
the sublattices) and average payoff are equivalent to those
predicted for ν12 = 1. Figure 5 compares the variation of
average payoffs when the anticoordination is extended by a
symmetric (β1 = 0.4) or an antisymmetric term (α1 = 0.4).
In the latter cases the variations of the potential matrices are
identical, therefore the system exhibits similar (Ising type)
phase transitions at a critical point dependent on |α1 + β1|.
In agreement with the phase diagram (see Fig. 3), the lattice
system evolves into one of the homogeneous states in the
low-noise limit if |α1 + β1| > 2. The most striking message
of Fig. 5 is that the average payoff remains unchanged at
low noise. Furthermore, the changes in the average payoff are
significantly smaller than those we observed for ν12 = 1. In
fact, this is the reason why we used higher values of α1 and β1
when demonstrating the effects.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that, in the sublattice
ordered phases (K < Kc) of the examples in Fig. 5, the average
payoff is always decreased by the appearance of additional
(1,1) and (2,2) strategy pairs. The mentioned trend is also
recognizable for β1 = 0, and α1 = 0 in the disordered states
because the additional symmetric (1,1) or (2,2) pairs are not
rewarded by extra payoffs. On the other hand, the variation
in the ratio of the pairs (1,1) and (2,2) is accompanied with
a suitable payoff increase at sufficiently high noise level if it
caused by A(ex) (instead of A(as)).
IV. THREE-STRATEGY GAMES
Despite the high degree of freedom, most of the general
features (discussed above) are preserved in the multistrategy
games. An exhaustive analysis of all the possible phenomena
goes beyond the scope of a paper. Instead of it, the most
relevant features of social dilemmas will be illustrated via
several examples for n = 3.
First we detail the effects of the antisymmetric components
in the absence of all other terms when the concept of the
tragedy of the commons is meaningless. Then the payoff matrix
is defined by Eqs. (17) and (18). Accordingly, for n = 3 the
payoff matrix is described by two independent parameters (α1
and α2) as
A(as) =
⎛
⎝0 α1 − α2 2α1 + α2−α1 + α2 0 α1 + 2α2
−2α1 − α2 −α1 − 2α2 0
⎞
⎠, (24)
and the corresponding potential matrix obeys the form
V(as) =
⎛
⎝2α1 α1 + α2 −α2α1 + α2 2α2 −α1
−α2 −α1 −2(α1 + α2)
⎞
⎠. (25)
According to the straightforward determination of the largest
component of the potential matrix the strategy pair (1,1) is
the preferred Nash equilibrium if α1 > α2 and α1 > −α2/2.
Similarly, the strategy pair (2,2) is recommended for the
players if α1 > −2α2 and α1 < α2. In the rest of the α1-α2
parameter plane (α1 < −2α2 and α1 < −α2/2) the preferred
Nash equilibrium is (3,3).
Now we consider the combination of A(as) given by Eq. (24)
and a simple symmetric component A(ex) favoring the first
strategy. More precisely, A(ex) is defined by Eqs. (14) and (18)
with values of β1 and β2 = β3 = −β1/2 (assuming β1 > 0).
The results are illustrated in Fig. 6 by a contentment map
for β1 = 1. In this phase diagram the three straight and thick
dashed-dotted lines divide the parameter plane into three
territories where the preferred Nash equilibria are (1,1), (2,2),
or (3,3). The slopes of the phase boundaries are 1, − 12 and−2. Similar phase diagrams are obtained for any positive
values of β1. More quantitatively, the phase boundaries are
shifted parallel and meet at the point (α1 = −β1, α2 = β1/2).
Evidently, the above-discussed case is reproduced for β1 = 0.
For β1 > 0 the players are satisfied when the preferred Nash
equilibrium is (1,1). For other preferred Nash equilibria the
players are not contented because the strategy profile (1,1)
always provides higher income for both.
Figure 6 shows clearly that the players are not content
in two of three domains of parameters that represent about
two-thirds of the α2-α1 plane. The portion of the region of
contented players decreases if n is increased because A(as)
supports the preferred Nash equilibrium of A(ex) only if it acts in
the same direction. Disregarding the opposite effect, there are,
however, additional (n − 2) orthogonal directions which can
prevent contentment if the strength of A(as) exceeds a threshold
dependent on A(ex).
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2
0
-2
-2 2
α1
α2
FIG. 6. Contentment map for the preferred Nash equilibria of a
three-strategy game on the α2-α1 plane when A = A(ex) + A(as) for
β1 = 1 and β2 = β3 = −1/2. The preferred Nash equilibria (1,1),
(2,2), and (3,3) are denoted by white, black, and gray pairs of symbols
with faces indicating the contentment of players.
A similar situation can be observed when the highest income
for the strategy pair (1,1) is ensured by the coordination
components. For example, if we consider the interplay between
A(as) and A(co) for ν12 = 1, ν13 = 1/2, and ν23 = 0 then we get
a contentment map similar to those plotted in Fig. 6. The only
difference is the location of the point (α1 = −1/4, α2 = 0)
where the three phase boundaries meet.
In the last example we discuss a model where anticoor-
dination dominates the symmetric part, i.e., when ν12 = −1
and ν13 = ν23 = β1 = β2 = 0. The straightforward analysis of
the contentment of players in the preferred Nash equilibria is
summarized in Fig. 7. For two players in this peculiar case
the average payoff is 1 for the strategy profiles (1,2) or (2,1)
3
1
-1
-2
-3
-3 -2 -1 1 3
α1
α2
FIG. 7. Contentment of players in the preferred Nash equilibria
as a function of α1 and α2 if the symmetric part of A describes
anticoordination between strategies 1 (white symbols) and 2 (black
symbols) for a neutral third (gray symbols) strategy. In the light- and
dark-gray territories both players are discontent in the preferred Nash
equilibria (1,3) or (3,1) and (2,3) or (3,2).
and 0 or −1 for all other choices. In the α1-α2 plane the trap
of social dilemmas is avoided along the line α1 = α2 > − 16 .
In the corresponding preferred Nash equilibria the effect of
A(as) can only cause some difference in the players’ income,
as indicated in the contentment map. It is remarkable that all
the other strategy profiles can be a preferred Nash equilibrium
with unsatisfied players.
Some of the above features are preserved for the n-strategy
potential games (n > 3) with straightforward adaptation of
the above results. For example, the deluding component A(as)
is defined by (n − 1) parameters; it forces the players to
choose one of the symmetric strategy profiles for nothing; the
potential matrices of A(as) and A(ex) span the same subspace of
parameters.
In the spatial evolutionary games the coordination compo-
nents determine the noise dependence of strategy frequencies
if A(se) = 0 because A(cr) does not modify the value of the
potential matrix while the payoffs are changed. This feature
results in a peculiar consequence in the noise dependence
of average payoffs if the system has equivalent preferred
Nash equilibria. Figure 8 illustrates the possible variations of
average payoffs in a system where the coordination component
is equivalent to a three-state Potts (or clock) model (quan-
titatively, ν12 = ν13 = ν23 = 12 ), and this term is extended
by the following cross-dependent components: γ1 = −γ2 =
0.1 and γ3 = 0. For the logit rule, the stationary strategy
frequencies are equivalent to those described by the Potts
model exhibiting an order-disorder phase transition at Kc =
1.5/ ln (√3 + 1) [70]. In this plot the solid line represents
the average payoff for all the three ordered phases in the
absence of cross-dependent terms. In each ordered phases
the latter value is modified separately by the cross-dependent
components if K < Kc. If the simulations are started from a
random initial state for K < Kc then after a domain-growing
process the system will evolve into one of the ordered phases
with the same probability and the society receives the cor-
responding average payoff. Finally, we emphasize that the
 0
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 0.5  1  1.5  2
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FIG. 8. Possible average payoffs as a function of noise K for
degenerate preferred Nash equilibria in a three-strategy potential
game where coordination components are equivalent and the cross-
dependent components increase (decrease) the payoff for the first
(second) strategy while the payoff remains unchanged for the third
strategy. The dotted, dashed, and solid lines show the results if the first,
second, or third strategy respectively dominates the system behavior
below the critical noise level Kc denoted by the arrow.
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equivalence of the three ordered phases is destroyed if a
payoff-dependent imitation rule controls the evolution. In the
knowledge of the above results one can easily find or develop
other n-strategy models exhibiting a wider range of social
dilemmas.
V. SUMMARY
Applying the frame of matrix decomposition we have stud-
ied the emergence of social dilemmas in n-strategy symmetric
potential games defined by a suitable payoff matrix A. This
approach is based on a suitable rotation of the Cartesian coor-
dinate system of the n2-dimensional parameter space defining
the payoffs. In other words, the payoff matrix is considered
as a linear combination of three classes of elementary games
representing the coordination (A(co)) between all possible
strategy pairs, the symmetric (A(ex)) and antisymmetric (A(as))
combinations of the self- and cross-dependent components.
In this subset of games the analyses are simplified by the
existence of a pure preferred Nash equilibrium that is easily
identified by the largest Vij value of the potential matrix.
Disregarding the occasional degeneracy we can distinguish
two typical behaviors. In the first case max(Vij ) selects one of
the diagonal components (e.g., Vkk) when the rational players
choose the corresponding symmetric strategy profile (k,k). If
these games define the interaction between the neighboring
players on a lattice then the system evolves into a homogeneous
strategy distribution in the low-noise limit of the logit rule and
it exhibits a continuous transition towards the random strategy
selection when the noise level goes to infinity. In the opposite
cases the system behavior is dominated by an anticoordination
component that enforces a sublattice ordered (checkerboard)
strategy arrangement on a square lattice, which undergoes an
Ising-type order-disorder phase transition when the noise level
of the logit rule is increased.
In the lattice systems, the above universal behaviors (e.g.,
order-disorder transition) can be observed for both the presence
and absence of social dilemmas. There is no social dilemmas
for the friendship or fraternal potential games when the payoff
matrix is symmetric, and it defines the potential matrix, too.
That happens, for example, when the payoff matrix is com-
posed of coordination-type interactions (A = A(co)) existing
between any different strategy pairs. The social dilemmas; that
is, the conflict between the individual and common interest, are
caused by the antisymmetric part of the payoff matrix, which
can be considered as Ate’s hand, originating exclusively from
the antisymmetric parts of the self- and cross-dependent com-
ponents. It is found that the symmetric A(ex) and antisymmetric
A(as) parts of the latter components span the same subset of
potential matrices determined by the possible self-dependent
components. Both terms favor the choice of a symmetric
(i,i) Nash equilibrium. In itself (A = A(as)), the antisymmetric
term is innocuous. One can find different versions of social
dilemmas when studying the interplay between A(as) and the
other components.
The simplest versions of social dilemmas can occur in
the absence of coordination components when the deluding
strength of A(as) overcomes the driving force of A(ex) by
suggesting another preferred Nash equilibrium. The possibility
of the latter events increases with the number of strategies
because the corresponding parameter space has a dimension of
n − 1. Exceptions are represented by games where A(ex) and
A(as) support the choice of the same strategy. In the latter case
A(as) helps the maintenance of optimum choice in evolutionary
games when the stochastic effects (noise) are increased. A
similar positive effect of the additional A(as) is found for games
with equivalent strategy-pair coordinations (as it is realized
in the n-state Potts model) favoring equally the formation of
one of the homogeneous strategy distributions in the low-noise
limit. For finite noises A(as) acts like an external field that drives
the system towards the distinguished homogeneous state and
suppresses all the other inefficient constellations.
For the typical cases, however, the interplay between A(as)
and a coordination-dominated A(co) [with max(Vij ) = Vii]
can be conflicting as is illustrated by the contentment and
discontentment of players in the preferred Nash equilibrium
dependent on the payoff parameters. The contentment maps
elucidated the emergence of different social dilemmas in a
large portion of some two-dimensional cross sections of the
parameter space. A wider scale of the preferred Nash equilibria
(and social dilemmas) is found for games where A(co) is
dominated by an anticoordination component.
The most relevant message of the above-mentioned content-
ment maps is that the probability of finding discontented play-
ers increases with the number of strategies if the payoffs are
selected at random in this subset of games. The high frequency
of frowning faces is illustrated clearly in the contentment
maps. This feature is related to the fact that A(as) supports the
community only if it proposes the selection of the same (pure
and symmetric) strategy profile (preferred Nash equilibrium)
that is recommended by the rest of payoff components. For
opposite or orthogonal A(as) values, social conflict occurs if its
strength is large enough.
We emphasize once again that the present conclusions are
valid for the symmetric two-player potential games and multi-
agent systems where the payoffs come from pair interactions
between the neighbors for suitable connectivity structures [51].
The presence of cyclic components, however, can cause more
complex phenomena. By contrast, for low noise the mentioned
complexity can be reduced in the so-called ordinal potential
games [49] in which the cyclic components are weak and not
capable of altering the preferred Nash equilibrium.
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